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O CENARIO HISTORICO E TRAÇOS ORIGINAIS DA CRISE MUNDIAL
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de crédito de hipotecas em 2007, a falha dos irmãos Lehmann em setembro de 2008 e mais recentemente o comércio 
bancário da Euro zona e a soberana crise de débito. Esses é claro ocorreram cada um em seu tempo e tiveram seu 
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“neoliberalismo”, mas do capitalismo tout court em certo momento de sua história. Suas causas subjacentes são 
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crise mundial são expressões disto.
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market collapse in 2007, the failure of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008 and more recently the Eurozone banking and 
sovereign debt crisis. They have of course each time had their own impact on production, trade and employment. But this 
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of its history. Its underlying causes are overproduction and over-accumulation at world level and an effective play of the 
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Brazil appeared to be decoupled from the world crisis are expressions of this.
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/+ 012345672041'+the crisis in its long term setting
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embraces be it in a differentiated manner, the whole 
of the world economy cannot be mono-causal and 
must be set in in its historical context. Paul Mattick 
(1981) observed that 
[…] “the periodicity of crisis […] is 
affected by historical circumstances. If 
the ultimate reason for every crisis is 
capitalism itself, each particular crisis 
differs from its predecessors just because 
of the continuous transformation of world 
market relations and of the structure of 
global capital. Under these conditions 
neither the crises themselves nor their 
duration and gravity can be determined 
in advance”.
He adds that the crisis cannot be reduced to
[…] “purely economic events, although it 
arises “purely economically,” that is, from 
the social relations of production clothed 
in economic forms. The international 
competitive struggle, fought also by 
2,0&*&+%0! %4'! $&0&*%(N! $-%4#8! &4Z/-4+-#!
economic development, just as this in 
turn gives rise to the various forms of 
competition. Thus every real crisis can 
only be understood in connection with 
social development as a whole”. 
The most important “social development” 
,<! *F-! 0%#*! 5<*N! N-%(#! F%#! K--4! >globalization” 
understood as the full “globalization of capital”1 or in 
Marx’s words “the establishment of the world market” 
(Capital, III, end of chap.15). 
[,00,V&41!*F-!10,K%0&=%*&,4!,<!54%4+&%0!Z,V#!%4'!
$%(W-*#8!*F-!</00!(-\+,4E/-#*!KN!+%2&*%0!,<!*F-!XYYI!
and its satellite states, the incorporation of China into 
WTO in 2001 and the rapid advance of liberalization in 
India, the crisis is a “global one” to a degree and in a 
ways unknown in previous crises. It is at this level that 
the crisis is truly a world crisis of over-accumulation 
of capital in the twofold form of productive capacity 
with overproduction and of a “plethora of capital” 
/4%K0-!*,!(-&4.-#*!%*!%++-2*%K0-!(%*-#!,<!2(,5*:!]4!*F-!
Q^^P#!*F-!0%V!,<!*-4'-4+N!,<!*F-!(%*-!,<!2(,5*!*,!<%00!
(LTRPF) was contained by the recourse by capital 
to the counteracting factors determining the rate of 
-C20,&*%*&,4:! T/*! &*! V%#! 4,*! 4/00&5-'! %4'! +,4*&4/-#!
today to underlie the world situation notably on account 
of the effects on constant capital of the progressive 
rarefaction of natural resources.
 
1.1 Accumulation in the advanced capitalist 
countries, unbroken but slower and slower
The vigor of true cyclical recovery and renewed 
expansion of accumulation depend on the scale on 
which the destruction of capital and commodities and 
#,!*F-!-C*-4*!*,!VF&+F!*F-!(%*-!,<!2(,5*!(--#*%K0&#F-'!
and the deck cleared for new investment (KLIMAN, 
2012, p. 3 and 77). A number of factors help to 
explain why this point is very long away today. The 
on-going crisis ended the longest unbroken phase of 
accumulation in the history of capitalism.  Over sixty 
years if the end of the Second World War is taken as 
the starting point; a little over forty years if 1976, which 
#%V! *F-!-4'!,<! *F-!5(#*!2,#*V%(!V,(0'! (-+-##&,48! &#!
chosen. Taking the growth rate of GDP as a proxy 
the pace of accumulation in the advanced capitalist 
economies slowed continually but only broke in 
2009. On account of the length of the phase and also 
because of the massive recourse to credit in the last 
stages, the crisis was preceded by the build-up of very 
large-scale excess capacity in a number of sectors 
and industries at different points of the world economy 
but also by the particularly high accumulation of claims 
on value and surplus value in the primary forms of 
dividend and interest along with the spurious growth 
,<!-.-4!$,(-!5+*&*&,/#!>%##-*#?!LCHESNAIS 2006 and 
2007). Because of the economic and political strength 
of the organizations embodying interest-bearing 
capital and the extent to which the realization of value 
and surplus value had come to depend on private 
and public debt, the course of the crisis up till now 
has seen the destruction of only a very small part of 
*F&#!$%##!,<!5+*&*&,/#!+%2&*%0!%4'!#2/(&,/#!>assets”. In 
parallel China has become one of the cornerstones 
of the world capitalist system and the present most 
important locus of global over-accumulation and 
overproduction.
_/(&41! &*#! 5(#*! 2-(&,'! *F-! <,/4'%*&,4#! ,<!
long term accumulation laid in the scale of the 
,22,(*/4&*&-#!<,(!2(,5*%K0-!&4.-#*$-4*!#*-$$&41!<(,$!
the combined result of low investment over part of 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and the massive 
destruction of plant, infrastructure and housing of the 
Second World War. In Europe the Great Depression 
led straight into the war. In the United States return 
to full employment only came with the entry in the 
war in 1942. In Continental Europe accumulation 
began again around 1950 once the most basic 
industries and communication systems had been 
made to work again. It took off in Japan when the US 
helped Japanese capital rebuild its industry to serve 
as a second productive base for the war in Korea. 
The US experienced a very short crisis in 1952 
before launching this war and so making its arms 
industry one of its major motors of accumulation 
over a long period and the principal basis of its 
innovation system to this day. In the 1950s and 
-%(0N! Q^`P#! XY! 1,.-(4$-4*! 54%4+&%0! #/22,(*! L*F-!
Marshall Plan) and foreign direct investment by US 
multinational corporations supported accumulation 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Due to the outcome 
of the Second World War the working class and its 
unions and political parties were in a position to limit 
*F-!2,V-(!,<!+,(2,(%*&,4#!%4'!54%4+&%0! &4#*&*/*&,4#:!
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a%#*!K/*!4,*! 0-%#*!/4*&0! *F-![-'-(%0!'-5+&*!54%4+&41!
of the war in Vietnam made the pegging of the 
dollar to gold impossible for the United States to 
sustain, capitalism enjoyed a stable and legible 
international monetary. This laid the foundations for 
“Fordism” understood as an “accumulation regime” 
in the meaning of the Ecole de la régulation and for 
what came to be known in English as the “Social 
Democratic Compromise?:! UF-! <%00! &4! 2(,5*#! &4! *F-!
face of workers’ demands (GLYN; SUTCLIFFE, 
1972) and the emergence of overproduction within 
the boundaries of interdependent but still self-centred 
national economies laid the ground for economic 
crisis.
Figure 1 shows that the 1974-76 crisis was 
&4!<%+*!2(-+-'-'!KN!%!5(#*!<%00! &4!*F-!H_b!1(,V*F!,<!
the industrialised countries. In many countries the 
bourgeoisie was confronted by strong working class 
and student action. But political class relationships 
were still conditioned shaped by the interest of 
the Soviet bureaucracy. It gave capital the leeway 
to readjust strategically. A key phase was the 
containment of the French General Strike by the 
French Communist Party and the CGT late May 1968 
followed crushing of the Prague Spring in August. 
This was reiterated in Italy in the autumn of 1969. 
Ernst Mandel (1982) names the 1974-
c`! +(&#&#8! L>*F-! 5(#*! 1-4-(%0&#-'! (-+-##&,4! ,<! *F-!
international capitalist economy. It is often referred 
to as the starting point of the “structural crisis of 
capitalism”). (BOYER, 1987, p. 65). There are two 
(-0%*-'!'&<5+/0*&-#:!UF-!5(#*!&#!*F%*!*F&#!0%(1-0N!&14,(-#!
(there are differences of course among authors) the 
very special historical conditions which had allowed 
the temporary establishment of the stable regime 
known as “Fordism”: the outcomes of the Second 
World War in the form of a huge destruction of plant 
%4'!&4<(%#*(/+*/(-8!%!*-((%&4!+0-%(-'!<,(!2(,5*%K0-!4-V!
investment and capital-labour relationships relatively 
favourable to the latter. Proponents of the Italian-
originated theory of Neo-Capitalism even announced a 
form of capitalism which might have rid itself of crises. 
Nostalgia for the “Glorious decades” hangs in part of 
the European left. They were simply a parenthesis 
which ended once capital accumulation had led again 
to over-accumulation of productive capacities within 
national economies and that “ !"!#$"%&"##'('%")$*!” 
L*F&#!*-($!&#!'-54-'!K-0,VR!F%'!1,*!$,$-4*/$!%1%&4!
a,4',4J#!54%4+&%0!+-4*(-:!
/89+ 2:)+!-;$<)-="=)>"+?<:#+%<%=@"#+#:)+=AA%@)@#+
barriers of capitalist production
UF-! #-+,4'! '&<5+/0*N! &#! *F%*! *F-! -C2(-##&,4!
“structural crisis of capitalism” is also used in ways 
that suggest the world capitalist economy never 
really recovered from the 1974-76 crisis. Obviously 
51/(-!Q!1&.-#!#/22,(*! *,! *F&#:! ]*#!(-+,('#!*F-!Q^^P\
Q^^O! (-+-##&,4! V&*F! d%2%4J#! 54%4+&%0! #N#*-$! %#! %!
major casualty. But it does not capture the brutality 
of class aggression as captured by Andrew Glynn’s 
“capitalism unleashed” (GLYNN, 2006).
As McNally (2009, p.42-43) has rightly noted:
[…] “for the most part, the approaches 
(that read the current crisis in terms of a 
'-+0&4-!&4!*F-!(%*-!,<!2(,5*%K&0&*NR8!*-4'!*,!
K-!%$%=&410N!#*%*&+8!&14,(&41!*F-!#2-+&5+!
dynamics of capitalist restructuring and 
accumulation in the neoliberal period”.
As he points out
(“there is a particularly unhelpful tendency in 
$%4N!,<!*F-#-!%4%0N#-#!*,!*(-%*!*F-!-4*&(-!*F&(*N\5.-!
N-%(!2-(&,'!#&4+-!Q^ce!%#!%!G+(&#&#J8!%!G0,41!',V4*/(4J8!
,(!-.-4!%!G'-2(-##&,4J?R:!UF-!V%N!]!F%.-!%22(,%+F-'!
the analysis of capital’s very strong reactiveness and 
so the return to slower but unbroken accumulation 
from the 1980-1982 recession onwards (this second 
recession being a follow-on to that of 1974-76), takes 
its lead from Marx’s observation that 
[…] “capitalist production seeks 
continually to overcome its immanent 
barriers, but overcomes them only by 
means which again place them in its 
way and on a more formidable scale”. 
(Capital, volume III, chap. 15)  
Between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, 
capital in the world system’s core countries devised 
three main ways to prolong accumulation until 2007-
2008, albeit at an ever slower rate. Although there 
Figura 1 - Annual GDP Growth in High Income 
Economies
Source: Durand & Légé, 2013
B-;$&)' Smith and Butovsky (2012)
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are considerable overlaps between them is easiest 
for the sake of clarity to list them separately. The 
5(#*! V%#! *F-! 4-,+,4#-(.%*&.-! (-.,0/*&,4! 20%44-'!
by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Freidman and led 
by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan follow 
%! 5(#*! </00! #+%0-! %220&+%*&,4! V&*F! *F-! Q^ce! SF&0-%4!
coup d’Etat and the sanguinary Pinochet regime. 
This response involved from the turn of the 1980s 
continuous steps towards the liberalization, 
'-(-1/0%*&,4!%4'!10,K%0&=%*&,4!,<!54%4+-8!*(%'-!%4'!
FDI. NAFTA, the Washington Consensus, the Treaty 
of Maastricht and the Treaty of Marrakesh were 
key landmarks. This created the conditions for an 
increase in the rate of surplus value from then on, not 
#,$-*F&41!#2-+&5+!*,!1&.-4!+,/4*(&-#!K/*!%#!%!10,K%0!
(necessarily differentiated) worldwide process. 
D0,41#&'-! *F-!10,K%0!54%4+&%0! &4#*%K&0&*N!K,(4!,/*!,<!
54%4+&%0!0&K-(%0&#%*&,48!*F-!+,4'&*&,4#!<,(!10,K%0!,.-(\
%++/$/0%*&,4!%4'!,.-(2(,'/+*&,4!V-(-!0%&'!%4'!5(#*!
announced by the Korean and Taiwanese episodes 
of the 1988 Asian crisis. The second method used 
for prolonging accumulation was the setting up 
in the US of a debt-led growth regime which then 
spread to the industrialized countries in Europe. This 
method represented, and continues to represent, 
*F-! (-#2,4#-! ,<! 54%4+-! +%2&*%0! *,! *F-! V-%W-4&41!
of effective demand as a result of the increasingly 
strong shift in income distribution between capital 
and labour as a result of globalization and the growth 
,<!54%4+&%0!$%(W-*#:!]*!-C2-(&-4+-'!&*#!+0&$%C!&4!OPPe\
2006 in the US housing bubble fed by debt supported 
securitisation and unsustainable levels of leverage. 
_-#2&*-! *F-! 54%4+&%0! +(&#&#! &*! (-$%&4#! *F-! 1(,V*F!
(-1&$-! *,! VF&+F! 54%4+-! +%2&*%0! %#2&(-#! *,! (-*/(4:!
The third way of prolonging accumulation adopted 
by the world bourgeoisie under the leadership of the 
United States was the support given to successfully-
managed reintroduction of capitalist production in 
China by the CCP and its incorporation into the world 
market crowned by its co-option into WTO in 2002. 
/8C+ 2:)+D%EE+ =@+#:)+$%#)+-D+F$-?#+%@.+#:)+FE%*+-D+
the factors counteracting it
"4!%++,/4*!,<!*F-!E/%0&*N!,<!*F-!#*%*&#*&+%0!'%*%!
most calculations are made solely for the United 
States. The one made Murray Smith and Jonah 
Butovsky is chosen because it is set in a discussion 
of the contemporary play of the counteracting 
&4Z/-4+-#!*,!*F-!<%00!&4!*F-!(%*-!,<!2(,5*:!
Use by Marxian economics of the approach 
used by Marx in chapter XIV of volume III has always 
K--4!#2,(%'&+:!f-*!*F-!+,/4*-(%+*&41!&4Z/-4+-#!%(-!
major factors driving the dynamics of accumulation 
and class struggle. Theirs is thus welcome. Pointing 
out that the real problem is that 
[...]of explain why this fall (of the rate 
,<! 2(,5*R! &#! 4,*! 1(-%*-(! ,(! <%#*-(?8!
Marx writes in this short chapter that 
+,/4*-(%+*&41! &4Z/-4+-#! $/#*! K-! %*!
work, checking and cancelling the effect 
of the general law and giving it merely 
the characteristic of a tendency, which 
is why we have described the fall of the 
1-4-(%0!(%*-!,<!2(,5*!%#!%!*-4'-4*&%0!<%00!
(MARX,1981, p. 14).
g.-4! &<! +%2&*%0! ,(! (%*F-(! &*#! 2-(#,4&5+%*&,4#!
–banks and corporations – only experience this 
*-4'-4+N!<,(!*F-!(%*-!,<!2(,5*!*,!<%00!&4*/&*&.-0N8!&4!*F-!
form in particular of heightened competition, neither 
they or the governments that aid them remain 
passive once they feel that it is at work. Accumulation 
as a process which bears neither end nor limits 
creates an imperative demand on corporations and 
governments spurred on by banks to react. It is 
these responses that contribute to shape the actual 
concrete course of capitalist development. Marx 
enumerates six counteracting factors: the degree of 
exploitation of labor, the depression of wages below 
the value of labor power, relative overpopulation, the 
cheapening of elements of constant capital, foreign 
*(%'-!%4'!*F-!&4+(-%#-!,<!#*,+W!+%2&*%0:!UF-!5(#*!*F(--!
all increase the rate of exploitation and the amount 
of surplus value appropriated. The cheapening of 
elements of constant capital and foreign trade work 
both ways. They both support and offset the tendency 
*,V%('#!*F-!<%00&41!(%*-!,<!2(,5*8!-%+F!-<<-+*!1-**&41!
the upper hand according to circumstances. The last 
factor relates to the increase in share capital.  Here 
*F-!%4%0N#&#!<,+/#-#!,4!*F-!5(#*!5.-!<%+*,(#:
Since the 1980s onwards factors numbers 
one, two and four have all been effectively tending 
towards a rise in the rate of exploitation. In the 
1990s technological changes had strong effects 
on productivity; absolute surplus value has been 
+,4*&4/%00N! ,K*%&4-'! *F(,/1F! *F-! &4*-4#&5+%*&,4! ,<!
exploitation by management practices while wages 
have been pushed down and worker discipline 
enforced through the play of overpopulation, in the 
form of the global industrial reserve army which 
has emerged though trade and direct investment 
liberalization have all been at work. Special attention 
is paid to the third factor below. Saying that the 
effect of these three factors is ephemeral (SMITH; 
BUTOVSKY, p.47) does not make up for what they 
mean for the workers and exploited people. In the 
long run we are all dead as Keynes put it. In the 
context of the world market, their effect may be more 
lasting in that of a closed of a national economy. 
In the 1990s trade and direct investment 
liberalization opened up even fully than before 
,22,(*/4&*&-#!<,(!&4'/#*(&%0&=-'!+,/4*(&-#!5($#!*,!(%&#-!
*F-&(!(%*-!,<!2(,5*!*F(,/1F!-C2,(*#2, exploit the working 
force in situ and exercise their competitive advantage 
.&#\h\.&#!0,+%0!+%2&*%0!*F(,/1F!<,(-&14!'&(-+*!&4.-#*$-4*:!
Marx also points to the effects of imports. When
[…] commodities are bought abroad and 
#-4*!F,$-!L4,*!,40NR!&#!*F-!(%*-!,<!2(,5*!
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higher because it is generally higher in 
the colonial country, favorable natural 
conditions may enable it to go hand in 
hand with lower commodity prices”.
This can be extended to FDI. US imports from 
China and South and South-East Asia of cheap 
manufactured wage-goods entering into the cost of 
reproduction of labor power can be hypothesized to 
have had an effect on the movement of the US rate 
,<!2(,5*!,<!4,4\54%4+&%0!+,(2,(%*&,4#:!
The cheapening of the elements of constant 
capital is the factor most closely depended on 
precise circumstances. The scale of the labor-
saving effects of information technology on the 
organic composition of capital and so the magnitude 
of the shift between constant and variable capital 
suggests that today the fall in the cost of “machines” 
largo sensu, however great it may be, will not be 
%! <%+*,(!,<<#-**&41! *F-! <%00!,<! *F-! (%*-!,<!2(,5*:!UF-!
raw materials and energy component of constant 
is likely to accentuate the fall of in the rate save 
<,(!-+,4,$&-#!V&*F!#2-+&5+!-4',V$-4*#:!V&00!K-!%!
factor to watch. Laurent Baronian (2013) points out 
that Marx only discusses the vegetable and animal 
raw material components of constant capital (e.g. 
cotton and wool) and only envisages the rise in their 
price as a temporary, passing phenomenon3. The 
reverse is true today. The rise in the price of energy, 
many minerals and other raw material inputs to 
production in which China’s huge demand only acts 
as an accelerator of a much longer term process, 
+%4!K-!#--4!%#!%!0,41!*-($!&4Z/-4+-!%+*&41!,4!*F-!
LTFRP. In this context the turn by the US to the 
massive exploitation of natural from shale may help 
it offset the impact experienced by heavily oil-import 
dependent countries (GEIER, 2012).
This stress on the counteracting factors leads 
$-!*,!%++-2*!+%0+/0%*&,4#!,<!*F-!2(,5*!(%*-!VF&+F!54'!
%! 2%(*&%0! (-+,.-(N! ,<! *F-! 2(,5*! '/(&41! *F-! Q^^P#! &4!
the main EU countries and in particular in the US. 
Given all that has just been said about the vigorous 
recourse by capital to several key offsetting factors, 
&*! V,/0'! F%.-! K--4! (-%00N! ,''! &<! *F-! (%*-! ,<! 2(,5*!
had not recovered. In calculations other than those 
of Smith and Butovsky, recovery is stronger as in 
Kliman (2012) or weaker as in Duménil and Lévy 
(2011) where they are either negative (0.84 when 
1998-2007 is compared to 1952-1971) or very low 
(1.13 when 1998-2007 is compared to 1974-1983). 
Their assertion that the crisis of neoliberalism, just 
as the Great Depression, cannot be interpreted as a 
+,* )"-$%$).&#,$/$/ is all the more striking. It cannot be 
understood independently of an overall theoretical 
framework a-Marxian stance which leads them to 
write that 
[…] if an overreaching explanation 
(of the crisis) must be sought, it lies 
in the objectives of neoliberalism, the 
tools used in their pursuit and the 
contradictions inherent in these aims 
and methods. (KILMAN 2012, p.34).
9+ 2GH+I43J5+730B0B+ 2+2GH+H15+4K+9L/C
The IMF and the OECD have both recently 
published their 2013 fourth semester forecasts. The 
IMF forecasts world growth to average 2.9 percent 
in 2013, below the 3.2 percent recorded in 2012, 
and to rise to 3.6 percent in 2014. The respective 
51/(-#!+%0+/0%*-'!KN!"S_g!%(-!O:ci!<,(!OPQe8!e:`i!
(%*-!<,(!OPQj!%4'!e:^i!<,(!OPQk:!UF-!"S_g!LOPQeR!
observes  that
[...] this recovery, which is still weak by 
past standards points to a worrisome 
slowdown in world trade growth, in 
<,(-&14! '&(-+*! &4.-#*$-4*! Z,V#! %4'! &4!
5C-'!&4.-#*$-4*8!%#!V-00!%#!+,4*&4/%*&,4!
of stubbornly high unemployment, 
particularly in Europe.
The IMF stresses that is also highly dependent 
,4!XY!5#+%0!%4'!$,4-*%(N!2,0&+N!'-+&#&,4#:
2.1 Over-accumulation and overproduction 
%E-@<"=.)+%+A-;@#%=@+-D+?&#=#=-;"+&%F=#%E
The present situation is one where excess 
capital in all its forms overhangs the world economic 
situation (CHESNAIS, 2011). Huge nominal amounts 
,<!54%4+&%0!%##-*#!&$2(,2-(0N!4%$-'!capital whereas 
they are only direct or indirect claims on production 
%(-! 0,'1-'! &4!.-(N!2,V-(</0! 54%4+&%0! +,410,$-(%*-#!
possessing the capacity of dictating their policies to 
governments through a variety of economic channels 
and political institutions. When writing his chapters on 
54%4+-8!;%(C!%0(-%'N!$%'-!*F-!,K#-(.%*&,4!*F%*
[…] in all countries of capitalist 
production, there exists a tremendous 
amount of so-called interest-bearing 
capital, or moneyed capital in this form 
(stock and bonds). And by accumulation 
of money-capital means for the most 
part nothing more than an accumulation 
of these claims on production, and an 
accumulation of the market-price of 
these claims, their illusory capital-value. 
(Capital, III, chap.30).
The course of capitalist development over the 
last forty years has pushed this form of accumulation 
ever further.  The magnitude of the claims on value 
and surplus value and the pace of their growth 
in comparison with that of world GDP is shown in 
51/(-! e! &4! ,4-! ,<! *F-! $,#*! (-0&%K0-! -#*&$%*&,4#! ,<!
10,K%0!54%4+&%0!%##-*#:!UF-!&4&*&%0!*V-4*N!N-%(!2-(&,'!
of exponential growth was brought to a halt by the 
2000-2001 crash on NASDAQ. Much slower growth 
followed, but its pace was barely affected by the 
OPPc\OPPl!54%4+&%0!+(&#&#:!]4!OPQP8!%#!4,*-'!KN!
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[...]“growth resumed, fueled by expansion 
in developing economies but also by a 
$4.4 trillion by the McKinsey Global 
Institute increase in sovereign debt”. 
(MCKINSEY Global Institute, 2013).
 
In its latest 2013 report McKinsey Global 
Institute expresses its concern that 
mno! %0*F,/1F! 10,K%0! 54%4+&%0! %##-*#!
have surpassed their pre-crisis totals, 
growth has hit a plateau. Their annual 
growth was 7.9 percent from 1990 to 
2007, but that has slowed to an anemic 
1.9 percent since the crisis. (MCKINSEY 
GLOBAL INSTITUTE, 2012). 
The authors are concerned that their indicators 
,<! 54%4+&%0! 10,K%0&=%*&,4! LZ,V#! ,<! 0,%4#8! +(,##\
K,('-(!F,0'&41#!,<! K,4'#!%4'!-E/&*N8! <,(-&14!'&(-+*!
investment) reveal a certain degree of retreat from 
globalization. 
K=<;$)+C+M+H0,K%0![&4%4+&%0!D##-*#!%#!%!i!,<!p,(0'!
GDP)
B-;$&)' McKinsey Global Institute (2012).
Constant 2011 exchange rates and $ trillion 
What is striking is the resilience of the accumulation 
,<! 5+*&*&,/#! +%2&*%0! (%*F-(! *F%4! &*#! #0,V',V4:!UF-(-!
%(-! *V,! $%&4! -C20%4%*&,4#:! UF-! 5(#*! &#! *F-! F/1-!
Z,V! ,<! &4*-(-#*! <(,$! *F-! #-(.&+&41! ,<! 1,.-(4$-4*!
'-K*:! UF-! #-+,4'! &#! *F-! +,4*&4/,/#! Z,V! ,<! 2(,5*#!
stemming from unrelenting exploitation, which is not 
reinvested in production or circulation and enters the 
#2F-(-!,<!54%4+&%0!$%(W-*#!VF-(-!&*!K%#&+%00N!V%1-#!
an inter-capitalist competition around the distribution 
,<!*F-!#/(20/#!.%0/-!+F%44-0-'!*,!54%4+&%0!$%(W-*#:!
With respect to over-accumulation and 
overproduction at world level in a liberalised and highly 
hierarchically differentiated global economy where 
some countries can still combine competitiveness 
and higher degrees of remaining protection relatively 
to others, their location is necessarily differentiated. 
Global over-accumulation and overproduction can 
go hand-in-hand with declining rates of productive 
investment in given countries as was the case of 
the United States in the late 1990s and 2000s. The 
/4&E/-! &4*-(4%*&,4%0! $,4-*%(N! #*%*/#! ,<! *F-! ',00%(!
(GUTTMANN, 1994) and huge household and 
54%4+&%0!#-+*,(!'-K*!$%'-! *F-!XY!K,*F!consumer 
of last resort and recipient of central bank reserves 
and private hoards (Sovereign funds from the Gulf) 
in search of safe investment. In the industrialized 
countries over-accumulation and overproduction 
%(-! 0%(1-0N! 0,'1-'! &4! #2-+&5+! &4'/#*(&-#8! 4,*%K0N!
automobiles, and sectors, in particular housing and 
construction. 
These industries and sectors have been 
the cornerstone of accumulation and in the case of 
housing and construction the terrain of the 2003-2006 
54%4+&%0!K/KK0-:! ]4! *F-!XY!%4'! &4! *F-!gS8! *F-! 0-.-0!
,<! /4-$20,N$-4*! (-Z-+*#! #&$/0*%4-,/#0N! ',$-#*&+!
over-accumulation, the pro-cyclical policies dictated 
KN!54%4+-!%4'!*F-!Z&1F*!,<!+,(2,(%*&,4#!*,!+,4*&4-4*#!
where markets still have a potential to grow, labour 
cheaper and largely unprotected by labour law and 
anti-pollution legislation less stringent if not inexistent. 
In far-East Asia excess capacity and overproduction 
concerns a wide spectrum of industries. This is a 
result of industrial accumulation in South-East Asia, 
in Korea and Taiwan and of course in China. Maria 
Ivanova (2011) has argued the close complementarity 
between the over-accumulation of capacity and 
of “surplus”, e.g. non-reinvested capital in the 
manufacturing centres of the periphery, principally 
China and the U.S.-based overproduction of housing. 
2.2. The contradictory role of China
Above it was argued that the third way of 
prolonging accumulation adopted by the world 
bourgeoisie under the leadership of the United States 
was the support given to successfully-managed 
reintroduction of capitalist production in China by 
the CCP and its incorporation in the world market 
crowned by its co-option into WTO in 2002. 
The tendency towards over-accumulation and 
overproduction was already at work in China before 
2008. Under Deng Xiaoping China progressively 
embraced, with an acceleration after Deng’s 1992 
Southern Tour, the model of export-led growth despite 
geo-economic and demographic characteristics very 
different from those of Korea or Taiwan: a continental 
economy and the world’s largest population. This 
+F,&+-! &#! *F-! +,4#-E/-4+-! ,<! *F-! (-0%*&,4#F&2#! ,<!
2(,'/+*&,4!%4'!'&#*(&K/*&,4!#2-+&5+!*,!SF&4%J#!#&410-!
party Stalinist shaped oligarchical economic and 
social system and of the export orientation foreign 
investment, notably by US corporations, both in 
manufacturing and in commerce.
It is estimated that if Wal-Mart were a country 
it would rank as China’s seventh-largest trading 
partner sourcing over $18 billion worth of goods from 
the Chines manufacturing system4. More generally in 
a liberalised global trading system over-accumulation 
can temporarily be offset and masked by exports as 
manufacturing capacity is destroyed by competition 
in other parts of the world economy. In the case of 
textiles for instance, China’s very pronounced turn to 
the world market coupled with the total dismantling in 
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2005 of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in WTO 
seriously impacted the industry on both shores of the 
Mediterranean. As noted by Ho-Fung (2012, p. 222), 
the miracle of prolonged over-accumulation in China 
has lain in its capacity to export excess capacity.
In the industrialized countries the crisis has 
exercised its classical function and destroyed industrial 
+%2%+&*N:!UF&#!,++/((-'!5(#*!&4!*F-!X4&*-'!Y*%*-#!%4'!
elsewhere in the OECD in late 2008 and 2009 and 
then again in many EU countries from 2011 onwards. 
In Europe plant closures and intensive restructuring 
are continuing. This has not been true for the emerging 
countries, particularly China. Indeed since 2008, 
the destruction in the US and Europe of means of 
2(,'/+*&,4!/42(,5*%K0-!%*!2(-.%&0&41!(%*-#!,<!2(,5*!F%#!
been offset by the pursuit of Chinese capacity creation. 
SF&4%!#-*!*F-!Z,,(!&4!OPPl\OPP^!*,!V,(0'!(-+-##&,4:!
Through very high investment outlays, it stopped 
the US Great Recession from leading to depression, 
in particular by ensuring a market for large primary 
products producers in South America thus insulating 
them from contagion very largely. In this way a break 
was put on the sharply downward path of world trade. 
In China, despite evidence regarding the fall in the 
(%*-!,<!2(,5*!LH%/0%('8!OPP^R!'/(&41!*F-!VF,0-!,<!*F-!
5(#*!'-+%'-!,<!*F-!OQst century, extended reproduction 
as laid out in volume II of Capital has been marked 
by very strong differences between the rates of 
growth of sector I and that of sector II. Relatively to 
sector I sector II has grown very slowly. The way the 
CCP responded the call made on China, to prevent 
the collapse of world production and trade after the 
collapse of Lehmann and the spread of recession 
in the US and the EC has made disproportionality 
worse. Investment has grown fast, despite evidence 
,<! %! <%00&41! (%*-! ,<! 2(,5*! %4'! #%.&41#! &4! *F-! <,($! ,<!
4,4\(-&4.-#*-'!2(,5*!$%'-!KN!5($#!-.-4!<%#*-(8!VF&0-!
private consumption has fallen as a percentage of 
Chinese GDP (HO-FUNG, 2012). The communist-
cum-capitalist elites entrenched in large cities and 
provinces are engaged in deep competition among 
themselves, the result of which is the multiplication of 
investment in plant. On the other hand, workers are 
refused the right to build independent trade unions 
of their own since the concession of this right by the 
Chinese Communist Party would open the door for 
the building of independent political organizations. 
An increasing number of workers now organize 
local industrial actions of different types, including 
strikes, but the working class does not exist as a 
force capable of weighing on the overall pattern of 
income distribution. The CCP is committed to growth 
even if this is based on accumulation internal to the 
sole capital-goods production sector (sector I). It has 
been all the less prone to put a break on investment 
by municipalities and provinces that until now it 
has been in a position to realise value and surplus 
through exports albeit at a slowing pace on account 
of weakening demand by the US and mores still the 
EU. 
98C+ 2:)+<E-!%E="%#=-@+-D+#:)+E%!-;$+D-$&)+%"+#:)+
cornerstone of capital’s present strength
The very slow growth rate of global GDP 
stemming from unresolved crisis in the US and near 
to recession conditions in much of the Eurozone and 
&4! *F-! Xq! %(-! +(-%*&41! -C2,(*! '&<5+/0*&-#! <,(! SF&4%!
and leading to a slowdown in growth which in turn 
affects South America. In the industrialised countries 
despite the dead-end of the debt-led growth-model 
no substitute has been really envisaged and less 
still put in place. Since mid-2011 the process of 
capacity destruction has been launched again in 
most of Europe while in the US new investment 
has remained very low. China is pleaded again to 
boost the world economy but to do so this time by 
seriously expanding its domestic market. Capital’s 
'&<5+/0*&-#!%(-!2-(#&#*-4*:!T/*! #&4+-! *F-!#*%(*! ,<! *F-!
world crisis it has succeeded in making the effects of 
*F-!-+,4,$&+!%4'!54%4+&%0!+(&#&#! <%00!,4! 0%K,/(!%4'!
the most vulnerable people in society, not only in all 
the countries ranged under the name developing, but 
also in the erstwhile centres of the world system.
The single most important explanation is the 
<,00,V&41:! S%2&*%0J#! 1(-%*-#*! +,4E/-#*! '/(&41! *F-!
past forty years has been the creation through the 
0&K-(%0&#%*&,4! ,<! 54%4+-8! *(%'-! %4'! '&(-+*! &4.-#*$-4*!
and the incorporation of China and India in the world 
market of a global labour force, coined as the great 
doubling of the global labour pool5. This sets the 
conditions for the increase in the rate of exploitation 
%4'!*F-!+,451/(%*&,4!,<!*F-!&4'/#*(&%0!(-#-(.-!%($N!&4!
each national economy. Capital can pit workers against 
one another between countries and so all the more 
easily also within them, on account of the economic, 
social and political relationships between itself and 
labour. They are extremely unfavourable for workers 
largo sensu and for the peasantry where it still exists. 
But they also represent an encouragement to capital 
%4'!1,.-(4$-4*#!*,!'&1!&4!*,!2,0&+&-#!,<!#*%*/#!E/,!%4'!
#,! *,!',! *V,! *F&41# ! 5(#*!2/*!,<<!%4N!%**-$2*! *,!#--W!
%!V%N!,/*!,<!E/%#&\#*%14%*&,4!2/4+*/%*-'!KN!54%4+&%0!
crises; second incite the exploited and the oppressed 
*,!54'!4-V!V%N#!,<!51F*&41!*F-&(!V%N!*,!-$%4+&2%*&,4:!
This is indeed happening, not least so in China.
At the moment however, what prevails is the 
extraordinary handicap of labour in the face of capital 
in the workplace and the macroeconomic advantages 
of cheap labour for governments and Central Banks. 
The global low-wage economic regime has been the 
setting for the expansionary monetary policy resorted 
to repeatedly since 1998 and for the unprecedented 
resort to quantitative easing in the most recent phase. 
p&*F,/*!*F&#!(-1&$-!&4Z%*&,4!V,/0'!F%.-!-C20,'-':!]*!
is also the setting for much of the discussion about 
the new technologies. The immense managerial 
opportunities created by ICTs, in particular for large 
transnational corporations, ranging from global 
network organisation and international and domestic 
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outsourcing to the new methods of work surveillance 
in production sites or with the new forms of individual 
outputting6, have given again a very high degree 
of topicality to what Marx names in chapter XXV of 
Volume I of Capital, the general law of capitalist 
accumulation. Namely that 
[...] the greater the social wealth, the 
functioning capital, the extent and 
energy of its growth, and, therefore, 
also the absolute mass of the proletariat 
and the productiveness of its labour, the 
greater is the industrial reserve army. 
(MARX, 1976, P. 15)
The advent of “structural unemployment”, of a 
situation where the younger generations are denied 
employment and of the generalisation of short or very 
short work contracts calls for the re-appropriation 
and renovation of the analysis proposed by Marx 
of the different strata of the industrial reserve army. 
UF-#-! #*(%*%! F%.-! #*(,41! 4%*&,4%0! #2-+&5+&*&-#! ,V&41!
to demography, the moment and conditions of 
accumulation and the relationship to the world market. 
Harry Braverman (1974, p. 382-388) sought to analyse 
the industrial reserve army in the US in the early 1970s 
and identify its three classic strata. The notion would 
(-E/&(-! (-\%22(,2(&%*&,4! KN! ;%(C&#*! (-#-%(+F! *,'%N:!
The industrial reserve army available domestically has 
always made a call on immigration. This has taken the 
form of great waves as at the end of the 19th century 
or in the 1920s and of targeted demands for different 
types of workers at different moments in Europe from 
1960 onwards (CHESNAIS, 2004). The extraordinary 
advantage that the creation of a global labour force has 
conferred on capital by making workers compete so 
hard for employment is one of the foundations of the 
2,V-(!,<!+,4*-$2,(%(N!54%4+&%0!+%2&*%0:
C+ 7417J6B041' no end of the world crisis in sight
Capitalist crises only end once the destruction 
,<! 2(,'/+*&.-! %4'! ,<! 5+*&*&,/#! +%2&*%0! F%#! *%W-4!
20%+-!#/<5+&-4*0N!#*(,410N!*F%*!*F-!>deck is cleared”, 
2(,5*%K&0&*N! (-#*,(-'! %4'! *F-! ,22,(*/4&*N! <,(! 4-V!
investment recreated at levels that permit the 
accomplishment of the full accumulation on a scale 
*F%*! E/-4+F-#! %! 0&**0-! +%2&*%0J#! *F&(#*! <,(! #/(20/#!
.%0/-:! UF&#! -4*%&0#! (--40&#*&41! %! #&14&5+%4*! 2%(*! ,<!
the industrial reserve army as workers producing 
surplus value and also in capitalism’s derived 
manner as consumers. Today the scale on which 
*F-#-!+,4'&*&,4#!$/#*!K-!#%*&#5-'!&#!*F%*!,<!*F-!V,(0'!
market. Fictitious capital in toto has been barely 
touched, even if a number of banks and investment 
funds have been hurt and seen a fall in their rates 
of return. As was said above, the destruction and 
restructuring of productive capital has taken place 
%4'!V&00! +,4*&4/-!/4-E/%00N! K-*V--4!+,/4*(&-#!%4'!
+,4*&4-4*%0! K0,+W#8! K/*! 4,*! ,4! %! #/<5+&-4*! #+%0-:!
Financial consultants and the economic press report 
*F%*! K%4W#! %4'! 5($#! %(-! %V%#F! V&*F! +%#F7. In the 
absence of investment opportunities with a rate of 
2(,5*! &4! %++,('%4+-! V&*F! #F%(-F,0'-(! #%*&#<%+*&,4!
(-*%&4-'!2(,5*#!%(-!4,*!(-&4.-#*-'!K/*!/#-'!<,(!#F%(-!
buybacks on a greater scale than ever. Interest 
rates are at their lowest level in thirty years, but the 
&4Z/-4+-!,4! &4.-#*$-4*! &#!.-(N!#$%00:! ]4! *F-!V,('#!
,<!,4-!+,4#/0*&41!5($ !>the growing challenge is too 
much capital”8. Niches will of course appear where 
2(,5*%K&0&*N!&#!F&1F:!UF-!(/#F!*,!&4.-#*!V&00!*(%4#<,($!
them into short-lived speculative bubbles. 
The low degree to which the destruction of 
capital has taken place differentiates the present 
world crisis deeply from the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. This has been due in the US and Europe 
to the speed and scale of government intervention 
&4! #/22,(*! ,<! *F-! 54%4+&%0! #N#*-$! %4'! %0#,! $,(-!
temporally and to a lesser degree of the automobile 
industry. All remember the statement by G.W. Bush 
that he had had “to abandon the free market system 
in order to save the free market system”. Elementary 
(-Z-C-#! ,<! '&(-+*! &4.,0.-$-4*! V-(-! -.&'-4*0N! %*!
work in the measures taken in rescue of the large 
banks and insurance companies at the core of the 
54%4+&%0!#N#*-$:!T/*!*&-#!*,!H,0'$%4!Y%+F#!%(-!4,*!
#/<5+&-4*! -C20%&4! *F-! [-'-(%0! 1,.-(4$-4*! %4'! *F-!
Fed’ conduct. A set of major factors, most importantly 
the dependence of the entire US retirement system 
,4!*F-!54%4+&%0!$%(W-*!2(-<,($%*&,4!,<!b-4#&,4!%4'!
Mutual Funds and the US bourgeoisie’s assessment 
that the its major rival China had preserved greater 
$-%4#!,<!,<<#-**&41!$%4N!,<!*F-!+,4#-E/-4+-#!,<!%!
10,K%0!+,00%2#-!,<!*F-!54%4+&%0!#N#*-$!*F%4!*F-!X4&*-'!
States’ allies and liege governments. The crisis was 
stopped from playing its purgative role because 
the risks for capital were too high. All the national 
elites that met in the G20 initially shared the aim of 
2(-#-(.&41! *F-! #*%*/#! E/,! %4'! (-#*,(&41! +,4'&*&,4#!
permitting a return to the debt-led cum export-led 
international growth regime. Once this proved to be 
impossible it has been a case of chacun pour soi. 
In the context of “non-cooperative” relationships in 
the global economy the US project is the one with 
most scope. It involves the relocation of a part of 
$%4/<%+*/(&41!*,!K-4-5*!<(,$!+F-%2!',$-#*&+!#F%0-!
gas as is it increasingly produced and so a new 
bout of exports from the US industrial base, With 
the additional support of the privileges of monetary 
seigneuriage, this will gradually lead to a reduced 
'-2-4'-4+-!,<!<,(-&14!$,4-N\+%2&*%0!&4Z,V#:!r--'!
to the imperatives of climate change will be weaker 
than ever all the more so since Hurricane Katrina 
in New Orleans gave US capital in vivo large scale 
pilot experience of applying Shock Strategy on the 
most vulnerable layers of society and defending the 
richest in the face of the effects of climate change. 
Other bourgeoisies have other plans. The thorough 
%4'! +,$20-*-! +,$$,'&5+%*&,4! %4'! 4,*! #&$20N!
privatisation of public analysed by Ursula Huws is 
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one of the British ruling class’s cherished projects. 
It represents the “expropriation of the results of past 
struggles by workers for the redistribution of surplus 
value in the form of universal public services” (this the 
$,#*!+,((-+*!%4'!*-00&41!'-54&*&,4!1&.-4!KN!%!;%(C&#*!
#+F,0%(R:! ]*#! #,+&%0! %4'! -$20,N$-4*! +,4#-E/-4+-#!
will be devastating. Other bourgeoisies will seek to 
apply the model, but this cannot be the basis for the 
[...] next wave of accumulation” 
(HUWS8! OPQO8! 2:! llR! VF&+F! (-E/&(-#!
the opening of what Rosa Luxemburg 
(1913, chap.32) “new provinces of 
accumulation” – of profitability but 
also of markets – on a totally different 
scale.   
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NOTAS 
1  In French the precise Marxist translation of 
globalization is mondialisation du capital with its 
b,(*/1/-#-8!Y2%4&#F!%4'!]*%0&%4!-E/&.%0-4*#:
2  See Marx, “Capitals invested in foreign trade can 
N&-0'!%!F&1F-(!(%*-!,<!2(,5*8!K-+%/#-8!&4!*F-!5(#*!20%+-8!
there is competition with commodities produced in 
other countries with inferior production facilities, so 
that the more advanced country sells its goods above 
their value even though cheaper than the competing 
countries. (Capital III, chap.14).
3   See Baronian, 2013, The problem of constant capital 
in crisis theory, p.190. One of the relevant passages 
<(,$!;%(C!&#!<,/4'!&4!*F-!+F%2*-(!,4!2(&+-!Z/+*/%*&,4#!
in volume III of Capital: [...] the development of 
+%2&*%0&#*! 2(,'/+*&,48! %4'8! +,4#-E/-4*0N8! *F-! 1(-%*-(!
the means of suddenly and permanently increasing 
that portion of constant capital consisting of machinery, 
etc., and the more rapid the accumulation (particularly 
in times of prosperity), so much greater the relative 
,.-(2(,!'/+*&,4!,<!$%+F&4-(N!%4'!,*F-(! 5C-'! +%2&*%08!
#,!$/+F!$,(-!<(-E/-4*!*F-!(-0!%*&.-!/4'-(\2(,'/+*&,4!
of vegetable and animal raw materials, and so much 
more pronounced the previously described rise of their 
prices and the attend ant reaction. And so much more 
<(-E/-4*!%(-!*F-!+,4./0#&,4#!+%/#-'!%#!*F-N!%(-!KN!*F-!
.&,0-4*!2(&+-!Z/+*/%*&,4#!,<!,4-!,<!*F-!$%&4!-0-$-4*#!
in the process of reproduction”.
 
4  Data published by China Labor Watch inter alia the 
Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/12/
walmart-companies-to-shape-the-decade 
5  Freeman (2008) estimates an increase in the size of 
the global labor pool from approximately 1.46 billion to 
2.93 billion workers. 
6  This is work commissioned by corporations in the form 
orders put to freelance workers, self-entrepreneurs 
and employees passing from a wage-earning status to 
one of contractual service provision.
7  The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 17, 2013.
8  See A World Awash in Money: Capital Trends Through 
2020, Bain & Company, Inc., http://www.bain.com/
Images/BAIN_REPORT_A_world_awash_in_money.
pdf 
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